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In order to determine whether competition policy a¤ects competition and
the pricing behaviour of …rms, we estimate markup ratios according to the
techniques developed by Hall (1986, 1988) and Domowitz et al. (1988) for the
Dutch and Belgian manufacturing industry from 1992 to 1997. Competition
law was applied less toughly in the Netherlands. We correct for three major
weaknesses of the method: …rst, because the estimating equation is derived
within the context of the theory of the …rm, we use …rm-level data. This
increases e¢ciency thanks to the larger number of observations. Second
this allows us to select valid instruments that have economic sense. Third
we include material costs in our calculations to avoid the upward bias that
occurs when omitting them. We …nd evidence of large markup ratios in
the manufacturing industry as a whole and in a lot of 2-digit industries.
The markup ratio did not decline in Belgium following the creation of a
national competition policy authority. However we show that the markup
ratiois higher in the Netherlandsthan in Belgiumin the whole manufacturing
industry but also in most smallersubsets. In addition, the import penetration
ratio positively in‡uences the markup ratio in the Netherlands, meaning that
imports do not discipline the industry.
JEL Classi…cation: C23, K21, L13, L4
Keywords: competition policy, markup, import penetration1 Introduction
Competitive pressure is generally seen as a good thing in economics, since
it reduces monopoly power and forces …rms to organise production more
e¢ciently. Welfare increases when markets become more competitive, and
hence governments have an interest in establishing and maintaining competi-
tive product markets. As such an antitrust legislation has been implemented
in the U.S. since 1890. For more than a century, the Department of Justice
and -later on- the Federal Trade Commission have investigated a countless
number of cases, the most important and recent one being the case against
Microsoft.
On the contrary most European countries adopted competition laws only
after World War II. Moreover these were not applied coherently, except per-
haps in Germany and in the UK1. Parallel to these, the founding Treaty of
the European Community has included tough antitrust rules against agree-
ments between …rms (Art.85) and against the abuse of a dominant position
(Art.86). Under these rules, most attention has been given to agreements
and abuses that had cross-border implications, for example attacking …rms
that were blocking imports into their country. Within countries, the enforce-
ment of antitrust rules was rather disparate. With the Maastricht Treaty,
subsidiarity as a principle was also implemented within this area of policy
making. Therefore, countries that were lagging behind have recently brought
their legislation closer to European standards.
In this paper we investigate the impact of competition policy on …rm
markups in two European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands. Both are
small open economies with very similar economic characteristics. However,
in 1993, Belgium adopted a new antitrust legislation very similar to the
European one, while the Netherlands continued the implementation of their
antitrust law dating from the …fties until January 1998. In practice it was
not e¢cient in …ghting cartels.
It often has been claimed that the Netherlands are the ”cartel paradise”
in Europe (de Jong, 1990). By comparing the two countries we try to get
some insights into the e¤ect of antitrust on the markup behaviour of …rms
in manufacturing. To this end, we use an exceptionally rich data set based
on …rm level company accounts covering the years 1992-96 to estimate price
markups and to analyse their dynamic behaviour. We base our method on
1See various contributions in Martin (1998)
1the approach originally introduced by Hall (1986 & 1988) and later adjusted
by Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
Unlike most papers in this literature we base our estimates on …rm rather
than sector level data. This is important because it not only increases the re-
liability of the estimates due to an increased number of observations, but also
allows us to take into account …rm-heterogeneity. Moreover, by the nature
of the data we are able to …nd good instruments for estimating markups.
Apart from analysing the evolution of markups with respect to the im-
plementation of antitrust policy, we make a number of other contributions
in this paper. First, we estimate markups for separate sectors and compare
them across the two countries. Second, as Belgium and the Netherlands are
small open economies, both countries are vulnerable to competition from im-
ports, which potentially have an impact on price-cost margins. We explore
whether import competition disciplines …rm behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section
we present the policy changes in both Belgium and the Netherlands. We then
discuss the econometric methodology in section 3. In section 4 we describe
the data and report the results of the estimations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Antitrust policy in Belgium and the Nether-
lands: Theory and practice
Belgium
In the late eighties the price regulation system was abolished. The reg-
ulatory system was mainly replaced by a new competition law that came
into e¤ect in April 1993. The new law was designed very similarly to the
European Union legislation, i.e. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
and the Merger regulation. Three institutions were established to put law
into practice:
1) an investigation body under the authority of the Ministry of Economic
A¤airs (the Service for Competition)
2) a mixed advisory body, composed half of economic experts and half of
representants of the Ministry (the Central Economic Council)
3) an independent decision body (the Council for Competition)
2The organisational structure reveals that the Ministry of Economic A¤airs
plays an important role both directly and indirectly: it grants exemptions,
can ask the Service to investigate a case and more importantly, the Service
is part of the Ministry. This casts doubt about the independence and ef-
fectiveness of the court since it must rely on information received from the
Ministry. Moreover the Service su¤ers from lack of …nancial resources and
understa¢ng. As a result only merger cases are investigated at the expense
of the …ght against anticompetitive practices and the treatment of demand
for exemptions. All these factors suggest that the competition authorities
have not been operating as they should and that a period of adjustment is
necessary before establishing credibility2.
Netherlands
Compared to Belgium, the Dutch political authorities have been slower
to adapt the legislation to the European standard. They were traditionally
more enclined to tolerate or even favour cartels (de Jong, 1990). These were
numerous and were fought only if they injured general interest (abuse prin-
ciple), a notion that was not de…ned in the law. This attitude gradually
changed under pressure from the EU. In 1991, the existing law from 1956
was amended. Later a new competition law inspired by the European prin-
ciples was introduced. The Dutch Competition Authority (known under its
Dutch acronym, NMa) was created and started operating in January 1998.
Contrarily to Belgium, a single institution is responsible for investigating,
judging and punishing. It is divided in three sections:
1) Investigation, Supervision and Dispensations (OTO)
2) Control of Concentrations (CoCo)
3) Decisions, Objections and Appeals (BBB)
Although the new body is also part of the Ministry of Economic A¤airs,
the new law ensured that the Ministry’s intervention would be presented to
the parliament in an annual report and that the current structure would be
revised after three years, making the NMa a transient body before a more
independent institution is established.
In a report presented to the OECD, the Dutch delegation stated that
”the NMa must build up a reputation and image of irreproachable conduct,
2For a more detailed description of the evolution of competition policy in Belgium, see
Sleuwaegen and Van Cayseele, Chapter 9 in Martin (1998) and OECD (1998)
3reliability and independence, and must meet the usual Dutch standards for
supervisory authorities in the …nancial sectors or the standards of the Bun-
deskartelamt in Germany” (OECD, 1997).
Given the evolution of the competition law in the Netherlands, we do not
expect that the Dutch business community drastically changed its collusive
behaviour over the period of our analysis, 1992 to 1996. We address this
issue in section 4 of the paper3.
3 The Hall approach and the speci…cation of
the model
3.1 The model
A…rmi in timet operatesaccordingto aproduction function £i;tF(Ki;t;Ni;t).
£i;t is the Hicks neutral technical progress. The …rm chooses capital stock
Ki;t in advance of the realisation of demand (Ki;t depreciates over time). On
the labour market the …rm can engage any amount of labour at wage Wi;t.
The …rm chooses labour-input Ni;t so as to maximise pro…t ¦i;t after the
realisation of demand. Demand for the output is stochastic. Under perfect
competition the …rm prices at marginal cost so that
p
c = 1
In a competitive environment, taking logs, using standard rules of deriva-
tion and expressing employment and quantities per unit of capital, it is easy
to show that:







, where X = N;Q
®i;t =
Wi;tNi;t
pi;tQi;t = factor share earned by labour
#i;t = ¢log(£i;t)
3For an overview of the evolution of competition policy in the Netherlands see Brusse
and Gri¢ths, Chapter 2 in Martin (1998) and OECD (1997)
4However, when …rms have market power, they will set a higher price that
exceeds the marginal cost. In this case:
p
c = ¹ ¸ 1
Equation (1) then can be generalised as:
(2) ¢qi;t = ¹t®i;t¢ni;t + #i;t
The economic mechanism behind this mathematical reasoning is the fol-
lowing. Under competition, the labour’s share measures the elasticity of
output with respect to labour input. In a non competitive environment,
…rms will abstain from raising output at the point of equality since it would
lower price. As a result ¹ will be higher than 1 (Hall, 1988, p.926). Another
way to see this is to rewrite (2) as:
(2’) ¢qi;t = ®i;t¢ni;t + (¹t ¡ 1)®i;t¢ni;t + #i;t
where the second term in the right hand side of (2’) is the rent that the
…rm extracts.
(Appendix 1 describes the derivation of equations 1 and 2 and presents a
more structural approach following Levinsohn, 1993)
Applyingthismethod to estimate markupssu¤ersfromanumberof short-
comings that could lead to unreliable and high estimates. The …rst of these
relates to the di¢culty in …nding good instruments to deal with the simul-
taneity problem in equation (2). When using aggregated US data, the usual
instruments are the growth of real GDP, the price of oil, the political party
of the president or the growth of military purchases (Hall, 1986 and 1988,
Hakura, 1998, Jun, 1998, Domowitz et al., 1988). Blanchard (1986) and
Roeger (1995) criticised these instruments on the basis that productivity
shocks are likely to be correlated with the instruments as well. To avoid
this di¢culty, Roeger (1995), van Dijk and van Bergeijk (1996) and Oliveira
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) modi…ed Hall’s model so that they could
estimate markups by OLS in a consistent and unbiased way. However their
way of proceeding requires more data and is less straightforward mathemat-
ically and logically. Moreover their work has been recently challenged by
Hylleberg and Jørgensen (1998), who argued that their method also su¤ered
from endogeneity as well as from heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (the
latter problems were recognised and corrected by Roeger (1995)).
The second shortcoming is that, in the original speci…cation, Hall (1986,
1988) only incorporated two inputs in the production function: labour and
capital. However, if materials represent a signi…cant part of the variable costs
5that the …rm must incur and if these costs vary in proportion to output,
excluding them would lead to an upward bias in the measurement of the
markup. In order to eliminate this bias, Domowitz et al. (1988) generalised
the Hall’s approach by incorporating material costs. We present a slightly
modi…ed version of their model. If we include material costs Mi;t in the
production function so that:
(3) Qi;t = £i;tF (Li;t;Ki;t;Mi;t);
we can generalise Equation (2) the following way:
(4) ¢qi;t = ¹t (®L;i;t¢ni;t + ®M;i;t¢mi;t) + #i;t ;
where ®M;i;t =
pMMi;t







This also can be written as:
(5) ¢qi;t ¡®L;i;t¢ni;t ¡®M;i;t¢mi;t = ¯t¢qi;t + (1 ¡ ¯t)#i;t







Therefore by regressing the LHS of (5) over ¢q we obtain an estimate of
the Lerner index that can be easily transformed again as an estimate of the
markup.
3.2 Our speci…cation
We apply the approach by Domowitz et al. (1988) in order to …nd good
and reliable markup estimates according to a widely accepted econometric
model. Then we adapt the methodology in order to check for three main
points. First, did the implementation of a competition policy law have any
e¤ect on markups? Unfortunately the toughness of antitrust enforcement is
di¢cult to establish quantitatively. We approximate it in two ways:
A) by capturing the dynamics of the markup. We look at the evolution of
the markup ratio in a country before and after a ’switch of regime’ occurred.
In Belgium the new competition authorities started to operate from April
61993 on. This means that if competition policy was e¤ective in disciplining
the industry, we should observe a decline in the markup ratio after this date4.
B) by interacting a country dummy with the explanatory variable for the
Netherlands, we can compare two di¤erent regimes of antitrust: the Belgian
system since April 1993 that applies a new antitrust law both similar and
complementary to European law, and the Dutch system that was much more
permissive both in theory and mostly in practice. This allows us to verify
whether the Dutch economy was a ”cartel paradise” as has been argued and
documented in the literature (see de Jong, 1990 quoted above).
The markup ratio should therefore be higher in the Netherlands than
in Belgium during the period under analysis. Hence, in Equation (6) the
coe¢cient ¯2 should be positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from 0.
(6) ¢qi;t¡®L;i;t¢ni;t¡®M;i;t¢mi;t = (¯1 + ¯2NED)¢qi;t+¯3NED+"i;t
Second, after we disaggregate the manufacturing industry to 22 subsets,
we test whether some sectors have higher markups and should therefore be
under more scrutiny by the competition authorities.
Finally, we check whether a change in the import penetration ratio in-
duces a decrease in the markup.
(7) ¢qi;t¡®L;i;t¢ni;t¡®M;i;t¢mi;t = (¯4 + ¯5IPRj;t)¢qi;t+¯6IPRj;t+"i;t
(j :industry index)
Introducing this factor will allow us to check for the robustness of our
claim. We test the sign and the signi…cance of ¯5 in Equation (7).
Note that instead of interpreting the Solow residual as the growth of
productivity plus an error term, we prefer to model it as a more general
error term, since this term represents the part of growth that can not be
explained by factors’ growth. Therefore,
(8) #i;t = "i;t
In our speci…cation both ¢y and ¢q should be viewed as endogenous.
Then estimating the previous equations using OLS yields biased and incon-
sistent estimates since E (¢qt;"t) 6= 0:
4In Sutton’s terminology, we check whether the policy change led to an increase in the
toughness of price competition
7Therefore we estimate the model using instrumental variables (IV) for the
endogenous variable ¢q. Depending on the speci…cation, instruments include
the growth of output at 2-digit level minus the growth of capital in the …rm
or in the industry. We also used GMM estimates using as instruments lagged
values of the level of output in …rm i for t¡2 onwards. Estimations with this
alternative set of instruments yielded the same results, which are presented
in the appendix. We eliminate potential industry-speci…c components in the
error term by including sectorial dummies. We expect of course that these
instruments are correlated with ¢q and that they are not correlated with
the error term. Finally we control for macroeconomic shocks by adding year
dummies.
4 Data and estimation
4.1 Data
Ourdata consist of an unbalanced panel of2205Belgian and 2471Dutch …rms
from the manufacturing sector (see the Appendix for a detailed list of the
selected industries), extracted from the Amadeus database that covers the
period from April 1992 until March 1997. This unique database compiled by
the Bureau Van Dijk furnishes us with …rm-level accounting data including
sales, operating revenue, tangible …xed assets, the cost of employees, the
number of employees and material costs. All companies complying with at
least one of the following criteria are included on the Amadeus CD-Rom:
- minimum operating revenue of 8 million USD
- minimum total assets of 16 million USD
- minimum number of employees of 100
Using …rm-level data in estimating markups has a number of advantages
over aggregate sector-level data;
1) e¢ciency: it increases the number of observations and allows us to
estimate the markup for every year of the data;
2) coherence: the estimating equation derives from the theory of the …rm
and therefore should require …rm level data (Levinsohn, 1993);
3) an econometric reason: it allows us to …nd good instruments by using
the industry-level variables as instruments for the …rm-level variable;
4) dynamics: we can follow the evolution of the markup over the period
we survey, albeit we use a limited time dimension.
8We use sales as a proxy for production and tangible …xed assets as a proxy
for capital. Table 1 and 2 display summary statistics of our samples.
Notice that the average …rm in the Netherlands in terms of employment,
capital and sales is much larger than in Belgium. The share of labour costs in
turnover ®L is 20% on average and similar in both Belgium and the Nether-
lands. The share of material costs ®M in turnover is much larger than the
previous index and slightly higher in Belgium (55%) than in the Netherlands
(50%).
Imports and exports data are available from the OECD STAN database
at the 2-digit industry level and are used to compute the import penetration
ratio.
Table 1: summary statistics for Belgium, 2205 …rms
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d.
Q 62.9 167.3 54 154 76.4 304.3 100.1 556 80.4 508
K 29.2 216 24.4 197 23.1 191.5 24.9 210.5 21.3 205.7
N 295.4 776 258.4 682 221.3 598.2 220.8 592.1 195 499.4
®L 20.1 13.3 20.7 13.4 20.5 13.7 19.8 13.3 19.3 13.1
®M 56.3 19.9 55.1 20.3 55 19.9 56.1 19.6 55.7 19.6
Note: Q and K are expressed in millions UDS, N in number of employees
and ®L and ®M are percentages
Table 2: summary statistics for the Netherlands, 2471 …rms
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d. av. s.d.
Q 371.2 3222 332 2935 361 3137 407 3533 667 5251
K 93 1558 83 1442 86 1461 101 1661 180 2418
N 1238 10911 1142 10190 1076 9829 1131 10422 2013 15139
®L 20.1 10.2 20.6 10.6 19.7 10.3 19.0 9.9 19.6 9.4
®M 48.5 18.5 48.3 18.6 49.5 18.8 50.7 18.3 48.3 18.6
Note: cf. Table 1
94.2 Results
We start with estimating Equation (5) by IV using the instruments presented
in subsection 3.2 for each year. This illustrates the evolution of the markup
ratio in both countries. Table 3 shows that the estimates of the Lerner index
are statistically di¤erent from 0, indicating a sign of market power in every
period. Comparing the second and the fourth column, we observe that the
markup is always higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium. It is slightly
increasing in Belgium while it decreased in 1995 in the Netherlands, only to
recover the next year to the previous level.
As a next step we pool the three years of data. We estimate the average
markup over the period. Unsurprisingly, the …rst two columns of table 4
con…rm the previous results: the average price-cost margin is signi…cantly
di¤erent from 0, and is higher in the Netherlands.
The estimates in Table 3 suggest that the markup did not decrease after
April 1993 in Belgium. It stayed more or less constant and we even …nd a
slight but not signi…cant increase in the markup in 1996, as shown in the
third column of Table 4, where we interacted ¢q with a time dummy for
1996.
In the fourth column, we estimated equation (6). The interactive country
variable is positive and signi…cant. This con…rms that the markup ratio is
indeed higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium and that this di¤erence is
statistically signi…cant. This important …nding gives weight to the ”cartel
paradise” hypothesis and makes clearer the importance of applying a tougher
antitrust policy in the Netherlands5.
This is further con…rmed by the results in Table 5. We …rst disaggre-
gate the Belgian and Dutch manufacturing industries to twenty-two 2-digit
subindustries, then estimate markups in each subset. In all but one subsec-
tor, markups in the Netherlands are higher than in Belgium.
In Belgium, the Lerner index is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in six
subindustries, while it always is in the Netherlands. Moreover the Belgian
subindustry with the highest markup is still below the Dutch average. In the
Netherlands many subindustries exhibit very strong signs of market power.
5An alternative explanation might come from a well known feature of the Dutch econ-
omy: the Polder model (that isan institutionally organised discussion between government,
…rms and trade unions introducing labour ‡exibility and moderate wage increase) could
act as a facilitating device for abusive behaviour by lowering the part of the rent dissipated
in higher wages. This corresponds to a de facto decline in trade union’s bargaining power.
10Table 3: yearly IV estimates of the average markup ratio in the
manufacturing industry
Belgium Netherlands
¯ ¹ ¯ ¹
1994 0.19¤ 1.23 0.34¤ 1.52
1995 0.20¤ 1.26 0.25¤ 1.33
1996 0.24¤ 1.32 0.34¤ 1.51
Note: * indicates statistical signi…cance from 0 at the 5% critical level
Table 4: IV estimates of average markup and interactive e¤ects
dy (1): B (2): N (3): B (4): B&N
dq 0.22¤ 0.34¤ 0.21¤ 0.24¤
D96 ¤ dq - - 0.04 -
NED ¤ dq - - 0.06¤
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
country dummy - - - Yes
Note: cf. Table 3
Finally, an astonishing result comes out from Table 6. While for Bel-
gium we …nd that indeed the import penetration ratio negatively in‡uences
the markup ratio (although not signi…cantly), we …nd the opposite in the
Netherlands. This suggests that the Dutch product market is not disciplined
by increased foreign competition and hence free market mechanism might
not guarantee competitive behaviour of …rms. This might be caused by the
fact that there existed no competition policy in the Netherlands while there
was in Belgium. In other words, competition policy might be important for
foreign competition to have disciplining e¤ects on …rm behaviour.
Ourresultsare consistent with the literature about the pro…tability of car-
tel arrangements or mergers (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) and the litera-
ture of IO models incorporating foreign competition (Geroski and Jacquemin,
1981; Jacquemin and Sapir, 1991).
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) reacted to a paper by Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds (1983). The latter argued that, under very general conditions, an
exogenous change in market structure lowered the endogenous payo¤s of the
…rms that provoked this change (think of such a change as a merger or the
formation of a cartel). However, this result holds only when …rms compete in
11quantity and when goods are homogeneous. When …rmscompete in price and
when goods are di¤erentiated, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that the
results are reversed in the sense that all …rms are better o¤ after the merger,
or after the cartel started operating. This comes from the fact that reaction
functions are upward sloping in a price setting game, and therefore the initial
price jump by the coalition is mimicked by the competitors.
Table 5: IV estimates of average markup by industry
Belgium Netherlands
Code Name ¯ ¹ ¯ ¹
15 Food and beverages 0.23¤ 1.30
16 Tobacco 0.22¤ 1.28
17 Textiles 0.26¤ 1.35
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.26¤ 1.35
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 0.16 1.19
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 0.15¤ 1.18
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.29¤ 1.41 0.34¤ 1.52
22 Publishing, printing and media 0.26¤ 1.35 0.45¤ 1.82
23 Coke, re…ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.15 1.18
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.25¤ 1.33 0.43¤ 1.75
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.27¤ 1.37
26 Other non metallic mineral products 0.31¤ 1.45 0.28¤ 1.39
27 Basic metals 0.20¤ 1.25 0.44¤ 1.79
28 Fabricated metal products 0.16¤ 1.19 0.27¤ 1.37
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.19 1.23 0.44¤ 1.79
30 O¢ce machinery and computers 0.22 1.28
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.13 1.15 0.43¤ 1.75
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.34¤ 1.52
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.32¤ 1.47 0.50¤ 2.00
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.23¤ 1.30 0.31¤ 1.45
35 Other transport equipment 0.17 1.20
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.23¤ 1.30 0.32¤ 1.47
Note: cf. Table 3; because of missing observations we were not able to
compute markups for all Dutch 2-digit industries
12Table 6: IV estimates of interactive e¤ect of import penetration
ratio
dy (1): B (2): N
dq 0.24¤¤ 0.19¤¤
dq ¤ IPR -0.02 0.23¤
Year dummies Yes Yes
Note: *(*) indicates statistical signi…cance at the 10% (5%) critical level
This mechanism can be applied to a situation where domestic …rms form
the coalition, and the foreign …rms act as competitors. Non competitive
behaviour by domestic …rms is then followed by foreign competitors who
’join’ the cartel.
Another explanation comes from oligopoly models that take into account
foreign competition. These models have taught us that it matters very much
what the nature of the imports is and where they come from.
Product di¤erentiation would lead to monopolistic competition that tends
to reduce the intensity of import discipline and to favour intra-industry trade.
The importance of intra-…rm trade might increase the prospects of e¤ective
market ’cartelisation’: a multinational …rm located in the domestic country
can control imports in this country (since many multinationals have their
headquarters in the Netherlands this factor is potentially important). Bar-
riers to trade could also play a role by reducing the e¤ectiveness of foreign
competition.
Moreover the origin might play a role: …rst, the European integration has
been associated with more intra-industry (synonym of di¤erentiated goods)
and intra-…rm trade. Sapir (1992) shows that the share of intra-industry
trade in intra-EC trade is higher than 75% in Benelux countries.
Second, market behaviours of various types reducing competition are
widespread in the EU. Businesses are very inventive when it comes to avoid
tough regulationand protectrents. That is why the EUcompetition authority-
D.G.IV- and the national competition authorities are so active trying to
detect anticompetitive behaviours. For example, the number of new cases
related to antitrust treated by the D.G.IV increased during the …rst half of
1998 to 277 as compared to 220 for the same period in 1997; the number of
solved cases increased as well from 244 to 278 (European Commission, 1998).
These behaviours are likely to be less e¤ective for imports coming from
the rest of the world. Indeed, Jacquemin and Sapir (1991) …nd that extra-EC
13imports exert a signi…cant disciplinary e¤ect on price-cost margin but that
intra-EC imports do not seem to have any e¤ect at all. Therefore they argue
that lowering non trade barriers on extra-EC imports would produce more
e¤ective competition and more e¢ciency.
To sum up, the documented existence of cartels in the Netherlands cou-
pled with the evolution of the European industry towards more intra-industry
and intra-…rm trade are factors that are likely to explain the non disciplinary
e¤ect of imports on the Dutch manufacturing industry.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed markups in the Belgian and Dutch manufacturing
industries using …rm level data, while most other studies used aggregate
industry level data. We followed the approach developed by Domowitz et
al. (1988) and added to this methodology by looking at ”switch of regime”
aspects to represent di¤erent regimes of competition policy.
Comparing two similar countries that apply di¤erent antitrust laws, we
found that the Netherlands which applied the law much less toughly also
displayed higher markups, both in the manufacturing industry as a whole
and in almost all 2-digit industries. This seems to indicate that too lax a
competition policy induces businesses to abuse market power, thereby harm-
ing e¢ciency and total welfare. Import competition in such an environment
does not appear to play any disciplinary role, especially since most of the im-
ports are of an intra-industry type, which are di¤erentiated by nature. This
brings further support for the dramatic change in policy introduced in the
Netherlands, where a competition authority is working since January 1998.
We also showed that markups remained fairly constant in Belgium after
a competition authority started operating in April 1993. Our analysis does
not allow us to infer whether this change in policy was anticipated, the policy
was badly implemented, it was badly designed or whether a combination of
the above explains the …ndings.
Finally, we stresstwoareasof future research. First, our’switch of regime’
analysis simply approximates of the toughness of competition policy. In the
future one would like to use an index of the toughness of competition policy
built on objective information about the e¤ectiveness of the competition
authorities’ actions, so that this type of analysis could be replicated in more
general environments. The construction of this index is currently under way.
14Second, a deeper analysis about the importance of the nature and the origin
of imports might be needed. The direction taken by Jacquemin and Sapir
(1991) might be followed.
15Appendix A
The production function is:
Qi;t = £i;tF (Ki;t;Ni;t)
A change in costs is written as:
Ci;t = W¢Ni;t + PM¢Mi;t + r¢Ki;t




Rearranging terms, this can also be written as:
¢Q¡ #Q =
1
c (W¢N + PM¢M + r¢K)






































































This expression can be reduced to:










pi;tQi;t = share of employee costs in turnover
®M;i;t =
pMMi;t
pQi;t = share of material costs in turnover
#i;t = ¢log(£i;t)







































¢qi;t = ¹t (®L;i;t¢ni;t + ®M;i;t¢mi;t) + ° ¢K
K + #i;t
Structural approach
Use the same production function. The time index is dropped for sim-
plicity. Write the pro…t function as:
¦i = pQi ¡wiLi ¡ riKi
where p is the price of the good, w is the wage paid to labour and r is the











where sstandsformarket share, ´ standsforthe priceelasticity of demand
and ¸i =
@Q
@Qi stands for the conjectural variations term with Q = Q0 + ¸iQi
and Q0 is taken as given by the …rm.
If ¸ = 1 then …rms engage in Cournot competition. If ¸ = 0 the Bertrand
case is valid.





































This is basically the same equation as in Levinsohn (1993) working with
discrete changes and is similar to the approach of Hall presented in section 3
and infra in the Appendix. To see this divide both sides of the latter equation














This is equation (2) in section 3 of the paper.
Appendix B
Table B1: GMM estimates of average markup and interactive
e¤ects
dy (1): B (2): N (3): B&N
dq 0.27¤ 0.37¤ 0.27¤
NED ¤ dq - - 0.06¤
year dummies Yes Yes Yes
country dummy - - Yes
Sargan test, df 8.85, 8 14.28, 8 19.4, 16
Note: cf. Table 3
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